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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN
DEPENDENCY CASES
Christopher N. Wu*
INTRODUCrIONO NE of the few cases involving the representation of children to
achieve public discussion arose in 1992. A twelve-year-old Chi-
cago girl told her court-appointed lawyer that she wished to return
home from placement with her maternal grandmother to her mother's
custody.' Her mother, however, lived with the girl's stepfather who
had recently finished a four-year prison term for sexually molesting
the girl. The stepfather now reportedly recanted his confession and
denied sexual abuse. Rather than advocate for her return home, as
the girl wished, her attorney actively advocated against reunification.2
The girl contacted a different attorney who agreed to represent her
and to advocate for the result she desired. The new attorney asked
the court to allow her to represent the child and replace the current
court-appointed lawyer. The court-appointed attorney, from the
Cook County Public Guardian's Office, refused to step aside, arguing
that the office was properly representing the girl's "best interests" and
that she lacked the right to retain counsel of her own choosing.
3
Did the client have the right to demand that her lawyer advocate
the result she desired? Or at least that the attorney not advocate a
result she expressly opposed? In the language of legal ethics, what is
the attorney's duty of loyalty to a client when the client is a child?
A major component of an attorney's duty of loyalty is the mandate
that the attorney avoid conflicts of interest, either between multiple
clients or between a client and the attorney's own interests. This Arti-
cle discusses conflicts of interest an attorney may confront in the
course of representing children in dependency cases, such as the one
described above.4
* Managing Attorney at Legal Services for Children, a comprehensive, non-
profit law firm for children in San Francisco, California. The author wishes to thank
Dena Graff, Shannon Hill, and Juliet McKenna for their invaluable assistance in the
research and preparation of this Article.
1. Rob Karwath, Young Rape Victim's Rights Tug Legal Cords, Chi. Trib., May
21, 1992, at C1.
2. Id.
3. Id. The court ultimately ruled that the girl could replace the Public Guardian's
office with an attorney of her choice. See Leslie Baldacci, Murphy Out as Lawyer for
Sex-Abuse Victim, Chi. Sun-Times, Sept. 5, 1992, at 12; Jan Hoffman, When a Child-
Client Disagrees with the Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1992, at B6.
4. In dependency cases, the state brings an action on behalf of a child against the
parents. See Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 67, 81-84 (1995). "The state... asserts that parental behav-
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Child protection, or dependency cases, represent a large and impor-
tant aspect of children's legal representation. This Article focuses on
dependency cases rather than delinquency matters, status offenses
(such as running away or being "incorrigible"), or other custody ac-
tions. The conclusions drawn about the lawyer's ethical duties, how-
ever, are applicable in any forum.
Appointing independent counsel for a child recognizes that the
child has interests in the litigation separate from the state and the par-
ents or guardians. Dependency cases, thus, almost always involve a
form of litigation with at least three major parties.5 In some jurisdic-
tions the court designates the child's independent advocate as a guard-
ian ad litem.6 Some states require that the guardian ad litem must be
an attorney.7 In others, a lay person may serve as guardian ad litem.s
In some jurisdictions, the court may appoint an attorney for a child in
a dependency case, but that attorney is not the child's guardian ad
litem.9
ior has fallen below the minimum level of societal acceptability and argues that inter-
vention is necessary in order to protect the child from parental abuse or neglect." Il
at 81.
5. Cases will often have more than three major sides due to the participation of,
for example, parents whose interests differ from each other, multiple siblings, grand-
parents or other relatives, foster parents, or Court Appointed Special Advocates. See
infra note 17.
6. Black's Law Dictionary defines guardian ad litem as "a special guardian ap-
pointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant,.
ward or unborn person in that particular litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 706 (6th
ed. 1990).
7. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 16-2304(b)(3) (1989) ("The Superior Court shall in
every case involving a neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding ... ap-
point a guardian ad litem who is an attorney to represent the child in the proceed-
ings."); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-44.5(1) (Supp. 1995) ("The court may appoint an
attorney guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of a child involved in any
case before the court, and shall consider only the best interest of a child in determin-
ing whether to appoint a guardian ad litem.").
8. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of a
child... in a juvenile court proceeding....
(C)(1) When the guardian ad litem is an attorney admitted to practice
in this state, the guardian may also serve as counsel to the ward
providing no conflict between the roles exist[s]....
(3) If a court appoints a person who is not an attorney admitted to
practice in this state to be a guardian ad litem, the court may
appoint an attorney admitted to practice in this state to serve as
attorney for the guardian ad litem.
Ohio R. Juv. P. R. 4(B)-(C) (Page Supp. 1994); see also Fla. R. Juv. P. R. 8.215(b)-(c),
(f) (West 1995) ("The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child
.... The guardian ad litem shall be an attorney or other responsible adult .... The
duties of lay guardians shall not include the practice of law.").
9. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 317(c) states: "In any case in which
it appears to the court that the minor would benefit from the appointment of counsel
the court shall appoint counsel for the minor...." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(c)
(West Supp. 1995).
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Other commentators have noted the conceptual difference between
acting as a child's attorney and as guardian ad litem.10 This Article
focuses on the role of the child's attorney. The fundamental responsi-
bilities of the child's attorney have historically been difficult to pin
down." Other authors in this Conference also discuss major aspects
of this role-definition problem.'12
The fundamental problem of defining the attorney's role in repre-
senting a child concerns the issue of who has the authority to make
final decisions about the goals of representation when the attorney
and the client disagree. Is the attorney bound by the client's decision
regarding the goals of advocacy when, for instance, the attorney feels
the client's goals are not in the client's best interests? This Article
does not seek to resolve this issue. The role that the attorney takes on
in the context of decision making, however, dramatically influences
the analysis of conflict of interest.
Increasingly, the academic literature reveals a growing consensus
that the proper role of an attorney for a child is to represent the cli-
ent's wishes (as opposed to the attorney's conception of the minor's
best interests) consistent with the minor's age and cognitive ability.'3
10. See, e.g., Marvin R. Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-
Child Client Relationship, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 259, 268-69 (1995) (stating that unlike
attorneys, a guardian ad litem makes his or her decisions based on his or her view of
the child's best interests, not based on the child's expressed desires).
11. For a few of the many authors who have commented on defining the proper
role of attorneys for children, see Donald N. Duquette, Advocating for the Child in
Protection Proceedings: A Handbook for Lawyers and Court Appointed Special Ad-
vocates (1990); Ann M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney: A Guide to Representing
Children in Custody, Adoption, and Protection Cases (1993); Martin Guggenheim,
The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for
Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76 (1984); Ventrell, supra note 10; Shannan L. Wilber,
Independent Counsel for Children, 27 Fain. L.Q. 349 (1993); Robyn-Marie Lyon,
Comment, Speaking for a Child. The Role of Independent Counselfor Minors, 75 Cal.
L. Rev. 681 (1987).
12. See Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Parents in Child
Welfare Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1621 (1996); Emily Buss, "You're My What?": The
Problem of Children's Misperceptions of their Lawyers' Roles, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1699 (1996); Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics: A Report of
Seven Interviews, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1763 (1996); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Eth-
ics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling
the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm
for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1399 (1996);
Peter Marguiles, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 1473 (1996); Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The
Ethical Duty of Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1435 (1996); Wallace J. Mylneic, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Ca-
pacity to Choose, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1873 (1996); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Inter-
est in the Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1819 (1996); Roy T.
Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem As Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role Definition
and Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1785 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Edwards & Sagatun, supra note 4, at 74 (stating, inter alia, that the
child advocate must inform the court about the child's desires); Jinanne S.J. Elder,
The Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Addressing a Troubling Question,
1996] 1859
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Part I'of this Article discusses the attorney-client privilege, specifi-
cally the attorney's duty of loyalty. Part II examines the conflicts of
interest that arise when representing multiple siblings. Part III looks
at the conflicts of interest that arise when representing the child and
the child welfare agency. Part IV addresses the conflict of represent-
ing both parents and their children.
This Article concludes that if the attorney for the child conceives of
his or her role as representing the attorney's view of the child's best
interests, even if the client disagrees, then the attorney will never have
a conflict of interest with the client. Any potential conflict of interest
will be reconcilable under the rubric of "the best interest of the child."
This result, however, should not be viewed as some sort of "safe har-
bor" for the practitioner. Rather, it should be seen as a strong signal
that the attorney is engaged in some function other than the practice
of law. This Article argues that children should be provided in-
dependent counsel in dependency cases and that the attorney should
be bound by the rules of attorney-client loyalty and privilege, which
ultimately require deference to the client's wishes regarding the goals
of representation.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-THE CONCEPT OF LOYALTY
This analysis begins with an examination of the duty of loyalty when
representing children. In particular, this part focuses on how the duty
of loyalty cannot be reconciled easily with the "best interest" model of
advocacy.
The commentary to the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") 1.7 begins with the state-
ment, "Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to
the client."' 4 The Model Rules deem the need for the attorney to
Boston B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 9 (finding that "[a] lawyer who defines and serves as
the proponent for each child's unique perspective necessarily challenges the system
and increases the opportunity for it to respond to and serve the interests and needs of
the children before it"); Ventrell, supra note 10, at 260 (stating that the attorney must
zealously advocate the interests of a child just as if she were an adult client); Wilber,
supra note 11, at 349 (same); Angela D. Lurie, Note, Representing the Child-Client:
Kids Are People Too, An Analysis of the Role of Legal Counsel to a Minor, 11 N.Y.L.
Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 205, 207 (1993) (concluding that "the only ethically proper role for
an attorney assigned to a mature child as a law guardian or legal counsel is that of an
advocate for the child's expressed wishes"); Lyon, supra note 11, at 681 (concluding
that it is the judge's role to determine the child's best interests and the attorney's role
to advocate on behalf of the child).
14. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt.1 (1983) [hereinafter
Model Rules]. Model Rule 1.7 is the general conflict of interest rule. The rule states
in relevant part that:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another cli-
ent or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
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have undivided loyalty to the client to be so important that the lawyer
is forbidden by Rule 1.7 from representing a client whose interests
conflict with those of another client, a third party, or the attorney's
own interests.
This duty of loyalty raises special concerns in the context of repre-
senting children. For example, what does the concept of loyalty mean
in the context of representing a child in a dependency case? Under
the attorney model of advocacy, if the client is old enough to express
his or her wishes regarding the goals of the case, the lawyer's duty
calls for advocating these goals.15 This model reflects the familiar loy-
alty of the attorney-client relationship and its general terms require no
further discussion. 6
On the other hand, under the "best interest" model of lawyering, if
an attorney for a child conceives of his or her role as advocating the
attorney's conception of the child's best interests, then the attorney's
loyalty shifts away from the client and to that conception. This model
of the attorney-client relationship permits the attorney to advocate a
position to which the client may be explicitly opposed.
The notion that an attorney might zealously advocate for a result
opposed by the client clearly sets the representation of children apart
from the normal context in which attorneys operate. The legal com-
munity, for example, would deem it unacceptable for a criminal de-
fense attorney to explain to the court that: "My client wishes to plead
not guilty, but in my opinion it would be in his best interests for him to
spend a little time in jail." Attorneys for children in dependency cases
frequently make the functional equivalent of such a statement.
Where the attorney sets the goals of the litigation, as described
above, an attorney would likely never declare a conflict of interest.
The subsequent sections of this Article, however, discuss in greater
detail specific types of situations in which conflicts arise for an attor-
ney representing a child.
The question remains then: If client loyalty is at the heart of an
attorney's ethical duties such that the attorney is mandated to avoid
conflict of interest situations, and the attorney's role in representing
children precludes the possibility of a conflict of interest, then in what
way is the advocate who adopts a best interest approach really func-
tioning as a lawyer? More specifically in the context of dependency
cases, how does the attorney's function differ from that of the judge,
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representa-
tion and the advantages and risks involved.
Il
15. Model Rule 1.2(a) provides in part that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation .... ." IL Rule 1.2(a).
16. When an attorney represents a competent adult client, the basic nature of the
relationship practically goes without saying. I
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the social worker, or, if one exists, the Court Appointed Special Ad-
vocate?'" Thus, as shown, the duty of loyalty presents special con-
cerns when representing children, in particular if the attorney adopts
the "best interests" model. A closer look at the possible conflicts of
interest which might be encountered between the child and the other
parties will give us a better perspective from which to analyze the is-
sue of the attorney's role.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN MULTIPLE SIBLINGS
The duty of loyalty can arise in a number of situations. For exam-
ple, as mentioned previously, dependency cases can involve multiple
parties, some or all of whom may be represented by independent
counsel. When multiple siblings are made dependents in the same ac-
tion, an attorney may be appointed to represent more than one of the
siblings at the same time. More often than not, the attorney will not
encounter an actual conflict of interest during the course of the
representation.
Issues involving potential conflict situations may arise, however.
For example, what if a lawyer is appointed to represent two siblings
and one of the clients claims she was abused by the other client?
What if one child is removed from the home due to self-reported
abuse by parents and another is still at home and denies any abuse
ever took place?' 8
If a conflict of interest arises between multiple siblings represented
by the same attorney, must that attorney withdraw from representing
any of the clients? That was the result mandated by a New York court
in In re H. Children.9 In that case, a Law Guardian 0 was appointed
to represent Rhomonia, age sixteen, and Christopher, age fourteen.
The State of New York accused their father of sexually abusing
Rhomonia. The court described the attorney's problem as follows:
[Rhomonia and Christopher] have divergent views as to the exist-
ence of the alleged sex abuse and the relief that ultimately should
17. Court Appointed Special Advocates ("CASA") are specially-trained lay advo-
cates who are usually assigned on a one-to-one basis to children in foster care.
CASAs spend a substantial amount of time with their clients and, in addition, regu-
larly make written reports to the court and appear at hearings. As of July 1995, there
were 610 local CASA programs in the United States. Telephone Interview with
Roberta Gonzalez, CASA National Office in Seattle, Wash. (Oct. 17, 1995).
18. Arguably, the mere potential of these types of conflict situations occurring
makes reasonable the conclusion that, if counsel is to be routinely appointed to chil-
dren in dependency cases, each child should have separate counsel. On the other
hand, could that ever be a sensible result when dependency cases dealing with six or
more children at a time are not uncommon?
19. 608 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Fan. Ct. 1994).
20. In New York, attomey/"Law Guardians" are appointed to represent children
in dependency actions. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 241 (McKinney Supp. 1995). An excellent
analysis of the role of the law guardian, which is equally applicable to many states'
schemes, is contained in Lurie, supra note 13, at 218-20.
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be granted by the court. In fact, the law guardian believes that
Christopher may be called as a witness by respondent at the fact-
finding hearing and that she may be required to cross-examine the
child.y
After interviewing both children, the Law Guardian stated that she
found each of them "mature, intelligent and articulate."22
Perceiving a conflict of interest, the Law Guardian moved to with-
draw as counsel for Christopher, but wished to remain as counsel for
Rhomonia. The respondent father agreed that there existed a conflict
of interest, but argued that the Law Guardian should be totally dis-
qualified from representing either child.
The court agreed with the father and ruled that the Law Guardian
must withdraw from representing both children.2 3 The court held that
there is a "reasonable probability" that Christopher confided informa-
tion to the Law Guardian relevant to the litigation related to the al-
leged sex abuse. The court identified an irreconcilable conflict
between the attorney's duty of loyalty to Christopher and to
Rhomonia. If he did reveal such information, the court reasoned, the'
Law Guardian would be in the dilemma of having to use the informa-
tion to Rhomonia's advantage, thus violating ethical precepts against
revealing client confidences;24 alternatively, not using the information
would result in a violation of ethical mandates to zealously represent
Rhomonia. The court went so far as to state that continued repre-
sentation of Rhomonia, as requested by the Law Guardian, would cre-
ate an "appearance of impropriety" which could only be avoided by
complete withdrawal of the Law Guardian and appointment of new
and separate counsel for the children.26
The New York court's analysis contrasts sharply with that of the
Iowa Supreme Court's in In re J.P.B. and C.R.B.27 In the Iowa case,
the expressed wishes of two children differed regarding perhaps the
most important substantive issue dealt with in the context of depen-
dency cases-termination of parental rights.
All parties in J.P.B. and C.R.B. agreed that the state produced suffi-
cient evidence at trial to support the termination of parental rights
over C.B., age thirteen, and J.B., age nine.28 An attorney named
Preacher represented both children at trial. C.B. was opposed to the
termination of her mother's rights and joined her mother in appeal of
21. In re H. Children, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 786.
24. Id. at 785 (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-1 (1980);
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 (1980)).
25. Id. (citing Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1980); Model
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-101 (1980)).
26. I.
27. 419 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1988).
28. Id. at 388-89.
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the decision. J.B., on the other hand, favored termination; his state-
ments alleging ongoing abuse became a "primary factor" in the trial
court's findings that return of custody of either child was unsafe. 9 At
trial, Preacher presented the opposing views of C.B. and J.B., but
called no witnesses (C.B. was later called as a witness by their
mother). C.B. and her mother claimed that C.B. was denied effective
assistance of counsel due to the conflict of views between C.B. and
J.B. Preacher's conflict of interest was the sole issue on appeal.3 0
The Iowa Supreme Court found no actual or potential conflict of
interest to exist.31 The court's review of the record showed that
Preacher vigorously cross-examined the state's witnesses and elicited
testimony corroborating C.B.'s denial of ongoing abuse. "If any-
thing," the court concluded, "the record reveals a substantial effort on
Preacher's part to discredit J.B.'s testimony to the benefit of C.B."32
The court went on to detail its most fundamental argument against
finding a conflict:
[T]he very reason for contested custody proceedings is that the chil-
dren involved are not yet mature enough to be self-determining. It
is the best interests of these minor children, not their wishes, which
determine the outcome of the case. In other words, their real inter-
ests are not inconsistent or mutually exclusive. 33
The court distinguishes, in this argument, between children-clients' in-
terests and "real interests" or "best interests. 34 The court concludes
that an attorney for a child whose interests conflict with her own view
of the child's best interests can avoid a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel by informing the court of the child's stated interests and the
attorney's view of the child's best interests.
Conflict of interest situations are rarely as clearly demarcated as the
J.P.B. and C.R.B. case. In that case, the court explicitly observed that
the attorney may have "discredited" one of his client's positions
through his advocacy of another client's position. If an attorney need
not withdraw in this circumstance, what conflict of interest situation
would require withdrawal? Apparently, as long as the attorney dis-
closes the clients' wishes, he or she may advocate any position that the
attorney believes to be in their best interests. The conflict between
,multiple child clients, or at least the significance of conflict, simply
disappears if the attorney presents his position in the context of the
29. Id. at 390-91.
30. Id. at 389.
31. Id. at 390.
32. Id. at 391. The court reasoned that Preacher made such a strong argument on
C.B.'s behalf that if anyone has cause to complain about the attorney's loyalty, it is
J.B. Of course, as to J.B., the error, if any, would be deemed harmless. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 391-92 (citing In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 86-87 (Mont. 1985)).
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children's "best interests."36 Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court found no
significant conflict of interest, unlike the New York court in H. Chil-
dren, which would surely find an "appearance of impropriety" that
would mandate the attorney's withdrawal from the case.37
In sum, the choice (or imposition) of the attorney's role, in large
part, determines the possibility of a conflict of interest.38 The Iowa
and New York courts' analyses differ, most significantly, in their as-
sumptions regarding the role of children's counsel. The New York
court used'a "standard" conflict framework to analyze the ethical
mandates of loyalty to the client and zealous advocacy. By contrast,
the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that the court's ultimate goal of
determining the child's best interests overrides those ethical
mandates.
This Article argues that the Iowa court's reasoning is flawed: The
court simply assumes that the children's attorney should have the
same goal as the court. Clearly, the judge has the duty in dependency
cases of determining the child's best interests. If the attorney for the
child also has the same primary goals as the judge, then how is the
attorney's role distinguished from that of the judge? Of the social
worker? Of the parents?
III. REPRESENTING THE CHILD AND THE CMLD
WELFARE AGENCY
A second conflict of interest situation arises in those jurisdictions
where the attorney represents the government child welfare agency as
well as the child. 9 A recent survey in California found that in seven
counties, the County Counsel offices often jointly represented chil-
36. Id. at 392.
37. See In re H. Children, 608 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (Fain. Ct. 1994) ("Public policy
considerations also dictate the disqualification of an attorney where her continued
representation would create an 'appearance of impropriety ... however slight.'"
(quoting People v. Shinkle, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1980))).
38. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text; see also In re Candida S., 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 521, 528 (Ct. App.) (finding no conflict of interest for attorney to represent
four minors, some of whom wanted visitation with parents and some of whom did
not), rehg denied, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1240 (Ct. App. 1992); In Re Elizabeth M., 283 Cal.
Rptr. 483, 491 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that failure to appoint separate counsel for
children with divergent views on visitation was not reversible error absent "miscar-
riage of justice").
39. For example, California Welfare and Institutions Code § 317(c) states:
In any case in which it appears to the court that the minor would benefit
from the appointment of counsel the court shall appoint counsel for the mi-
nor .... The court shall determine if representation of both the petitioning
agency and the minor constitutes a conflict of interest. If the court finds
there is a conflict of interest, separate counsel shall be appointed for the
minor.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 317(c) (West Supp. 1995).
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dren and the petitioning Department of Social Services.40 California
statutes, however, provide that in cases of joint representation, in-
dependent counsel for the child shall be appointed in the event of a
conflict between the Department of Social Services and the child.4'
The survey found that, of the seven counties where county attor-
neys represented both the social services agency and the child in a
substantial portion of cases, the county attorneys "conflicted out" of
representing the child very rarely in two of the counties and from
twenty-five to almost ninety percent of the time in the other five coun-
ties.42 Thus, in California, which allows dual representation of the
child welfare agency and the child *absent a conflict of interest,
whether an attorney raises a conflict of interest that would lead to the
appointment of separate counsel for the child appears to be a matter
of local "culture."
The California statutes mention conflicts of interest between the
child welfare agency and the child but nowhere defines it, either by
statute or in case law. What possible common definition of "conflict
of interest" could result in the California survey's wide disparity of
findings between jurisdictions?
Again, the answer must lie in the definition of the attorney's role in
the representation of his or her client. Arguably, because protection
of the subject child is the government's primary interest in a depen-
dency case, the attorney for the child welfare agency could be said to
be acting "in the child's interest." Would it be sufficient evidence of a
conflict if the attorney's investigation revealed that the child and the
social worker desired different results in a primary issue in the case-
e.g., whether or not the child is removed from parental custody? If so,
then in those jurisdictions that allow dual representation and reveal
low rates of declared conflicts of interest, either an investigation of the
child's wishes is not being made, or the child (at least among those old
enough to express their wishes) is always in agreement with the social
worker. It is safe to assume that the latter situation is not invariably
the case.
The Oregon Court of Appeals at one time took an approach differ-
ent than that reflected by the California statute. In 1974, in State ex
reL Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Wade,43 the court
declared that children in termination of parental rights cases present
separate interests and that the court must appoint independent coun-
sel for the children in every case.44 The trial court had held that the
40. Sharon Kalemkiarian & Susan Duke, Do Children Get Competent Counsel?
A 58-County Survey of Standards for Attorneys Representing Children in Juvenile
Court 3, 6 (1994).
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 3, 6.
43. 527 P.2d 753 (Or. Ct. App.), reconsideration denied, 528 P.2d 1382 (1974), ap-
peal dismissed, 423 U.S. 806 (1975).
44. Id. at 757.
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attorney foir the state could also provide "adequate and effective" rep-
resentation for the children.45 The district attorney, representing the
state child welfare agency, argued that the state's interests were
equivalent to the children's.
The appellate court disagreed and held that independent counsel
for children must be ordered at all termination of parental rights pro-
ceedings. 46 The court reasoned that the state's interest in assuring
adoptions, and thereby relieving the state of foster care and other
costs,
is clearly a source of potential conflict [of interest] which may pre-
vent the district attorney-whose client in these proceedings is pri-
marily the state-from providing a child with the effective
representation of which independent counsel would be capable.
47
Just a year later, in an opinion by the same judge, the court reversed
its holding mandating appointment of counsel to minors. In In re D. ,
the court held that the trial court did not err in having failed to ap-
point independent counsel for the minor in a private adoption ac-
tion.49 Rejecting the inflexible rule enunciated in its earlier case, the
court opted for a case-by-case analysis of the need for independent
counsel to be conducted by the trial court."0 The court stated that
"[d]evelopments since Wade" had convinced them that the more re-
strictive rule was overbroad."' The court, however, did not specify the
"developments" to which it was referring.52 The court noted that, in
this instance, the child was too young to communicate his own posi-
tion to his attorney and the record contained abundant evidence of
this fact. Finally, the court concluded that independent counsel for
the child would not likely have made any significant further
contribution. 3
Where the Wade court found independent representation of chil-
dren to be essential to due process because of the inherent potential
for conflict of interest with other parties, the same court a year later
emphasized the need for a flexible approach that takes into account
factors of economy, judicial and otherwise.54 Arguably, the debate
45. Id. at 755.
46. Id. at 757.
47. Id.
48. 547 P.2d 175 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976).
49. Id. at 182.
50. Id. at 181.
51. Id. at 180.
52. Id.
53. Id at 181-82.
54. Id. at 181 n.10 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973), that
held that appointment of counsel in probation and parole revocation proceedings
should be considered on a case-by-case basis). A rule requiring appointment in every
case, while simpler, would, among other things, "impose direct costs and serious col-
lateral disadvantages without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case
for a constructive contribution by counsel." Id
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about the prohibitive financial costs of providing representation in
every case played a part in the "developments since Wade," which the
court mentioned.
The new Oregon rule requires the trial court to speculate in each
case about the contribution an attorney for a child might make. Such
speculation will necessarily implicate notions of the duties and respon-
sibilities inherent in the role of children's counsel. For example, this
analysis may ask: when an attorney already represents the child wel-
fare agency in a dependency case, what additional tasks must he per-
form if he is also appointed to represent the child? The answer
depends on how the lawyer views the role of children's counsel and
what, if any, duties are imposed on the attorney by the court. As a
practical matter, however, in jurisdictions that permit simultaneous
representation of the child and the agency, attorneys will unlikely ac-
tually perform any additional tasks beyond their representation of the
agency.
Thus, an attorney who represents both the agency and the child
confronts two distinct barriers to declaring conflicts of interest: (1)
the attorney must be able to distinguish between the two roles of rep-
resenting the child welfare agency and of representing the child (e.g.,
are they both to represent the "best interests of the child?"); and (2)
the conflict must be brought to the attorney's attention. The latter
question depends, in part, on the extent to which the attorney's han-
dling of the case is designed to discover conflicts where they exist."5
IV. REPRESENTING PARENTS AND CHILDREN
Finally, a conflict may exist between the interests of the child and
the interests of the parent. The author is not, however, aware of any
dependency court that allows an attorney to simultaneously represent
parents and children in the same case. The rationale behind this prac-
tice seems clear: In dependency cases, the state charges parents with
the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of their children. Children are
the alleged victims and their parents are alleged to be the cause of
their suffering. Dual representation would thus present an inherent
conflict of interest or at least a strong potential of one.
There are strong, unresolved policy conflicts in child advocacy, as
evidenced by conflicting commentary about parental control over chil-
dren's attorneys. For example, several important commentators have
concluded that children's attorneys should presumptively look to par-
55. The chances of discovering a conflict with the child client's expressed wishes
decrease substantially, for example, if the lawyer fails to interview the child. Unfortu-
nately, not all lawyers who represent children see meeting the client as an indispensa-
ble element of representation.
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ents for guidance in the absence of evidence to overcome that
presumption. 6
In Before the Best Interests of the Child, the Yale team of Joseph
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit ("GF&S"), perhaps the
most influential architects of modem child welfare policy, advocated
for a parental presumption.57 GF&S' scheme proposes that children
may only have counsel in one of two ways: either the parents hire an
attorney or the court appoints one. These authors argued that to al-
low children to retain counsel on their own would harm the family
integrity to which they are entitled.58
Frequently, when parents hire the attorney, the lawyer's ultimate
responsibility requires her to act in accordance with the parents'
wishes. GF&S used a case example in which a custodial mother hired
the authors as counsel for her children to clarify the custody and visi-
tation situation after a divorce:
We accepted her request on the understanding that we would coun-
sel her children, advise her as to their needs-always making clear
to them that she, as their custodial parent, had final say both with
regard to accepting our advice and to our continuing to provide
representation. 59
The authors presume that children are incompetent decision makers
and require adults to make decisions for them. Thus, GF&S maintain
that attorneys who are loyal to the custodial parent (which may be the
court), in fact, can best serve children. If the law clearly defined the
identity of the "custodial parent" at any particular time, the result
would be that "every child before the law [would find] himself in the
position where adults 'know best' what is good for him and decide
that with or without regard to his wishes.
60
In the typical dependency case, however, the court appoints the at-
torney for the child. GF&S argue that in this case the court's "cus-
tody" replaces the presumption of parental autonomy.61 Counsel for
the child then functions essentially as a guardian ad litem-making
dispositional recommendations, monitoring the speed of the process,
and scrutinizing the child's care.62
56. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein et al., Before the Best Interests of the Child 112
(1979).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. at 122.
62. The attorney looks to the court, not the client, to define the goals of represen-
tation. GF&S state: "Counsel cannot turn directly to the children whom he repre-
sents for his instructions. Children are by definition persons in need of adult
caretakers who determine what is best for them." Id.; see also Guggenheim, supra
note 11, at 91 n.68 (discussing the impact children's counsel may have on parents'
rights and the need to consider parental privacy and autonomy before appointing
counsel for children).
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One commentator recently has proposed a specific amendment to
the Model Rules. In a 1993 Symposium on the Rights of Children,
Jonathan 0. Hafen proposed giving parents a "rebuttable right" to
direct the course of representation when a minor is represented by an
attorney.63 The presumption may be overcome if the parents are
shown to have a conflict of interest with the child or if the court finds
them to be "unfit." In that case the child's guardian ad litem directs
the course of representation. 65 The court has the discretion to appoint
a guardian ad litem if one has not already been appointed. In the
alternative, if the child is "sufficiently mature," the attorney should
have a "normal attorney-client relationship with the child."'66
Under Hafen's proposal, a "mature" minor can have a "normal '67
relationship with his attorney only if the parents are unable to direct
the attorney and if the court appoints no guardian ad litem.68 By con-
trast, GF&S do not perceive any room for a "normal" attorney-client
relationship with a child-client at all.69
These positions have had little impact on the policy regarding the
appointment of counsel for children, particularly in the dependency
area, the focus of this Article. Dependency cases in general provide
strong grounds for allowing children to have counsel independent
from their parents. Children have a strong interest in being protected
from abuse, neglect, or abandonment by their parents. A high poten-
tial for conflict exists, of course, between children's interests (however
they are defined) and parents' interests in the dependency context.
As a result, juvenile court dependency systems generally recognize a
right to counsel for children independent of the representation af-
forded to parents, but fail to clearly define the attorney's role.7 °
CONCLUSION
This Article's primary ambition is to discuss conflicts of interest that
commonly arise in the course of the legal representation of children in
dependency cases. As a secondary, and somewhat broader ambition,
this Article seeks to show how analyses of conflicts of interest in the
dependency area hinge on the definition of the attorney-client rela-
63. Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and Legal Representation-The Proper
Roles of Children, Parents, and Attorneys, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423,
462 (1993). The proposal would amend Model Rule 1.14. See Model Rules, supra
note 14, Rule 1.14.
64. Hafen, supra note 63, at 462.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. "Normal" is not defined by Hafen but is presumed to mean that the attorney
will zealously represent the client's wishes.
68. See id.
69. Goldstein et al., supra note 56, at 122.
70. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for examples of statutes providing
for appointment of children's counsel.
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tionship. That relationship is the subject of much commentary and
little resolution.
To the extent that the role of the attorney deviates from the tradi-
tional one of zealously advocating the client's expressed wishes, the
possibility of conflicts of interest with another party diminishes. But if
the prohibition against representing multiple clients whose interests
conflict is founded upon both the attorney's duty of loyalty to the cli-
ent and the duty to zealously advocate the client's aims, it seems legiti-
mate to ask how the role assigned to the attorney resembles the
practice of law at all.
This question, and the role-definition problem from which it arises,
applies to any type of case in which an attorney may be representing a
child. If the attorney for a child must independently determine what
the attorney believes are the child's "best interests" before taking a
position in the case, what gives the attorney any knowledge or skill in
that domain? In the dependency context, determining the child's best
interests would appear to be the primary domain of the court and the
child welfare agency. How many parents would say that they too do
not want what is in their child's "best interests"? In other legal con-
texts, the personnel may change (e.g., mental health professionals in
commitment cases, teachers and school staff in education cases, pro-
bation staff in delinquency cases), but almost all will base their posi-
tion in what they believe to be in the child's best interest.
In other words, everyone in children's cases already claims some
stake in determining the child's best interests. What can the attorney
for the child then bring to the table that is not already "covered" by
the other players?7 ' Unless the client is protected by the attorney-
client privilege, the attorney brings conceptually little to the case.
Sorting out conflicts of interest for children's attorneys will first re-
quire sorting out the role-definition issue. The current situation is a
muddled mess. Clearing up that mess will require some difficult pol-
icy decisions. Giving children access to counsel may be grounded
upon a recognition that they are independent parties to actions that
concern them and have independent interests with an equal right to be
zealously advocated as are other parties. To move in the opposite di-
71. The Honorable Leonard Edwards points out to me that the child's attorney is
sometimes the only person in the courtroom who raises the important issue of
whether the government made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to
remove the child from the parental home, as is required by the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679 (1994). Telephone Interview
with Hon. Leonard P. Edwards (Nov. 28, 1995). It is true that the child's lawyer may
be a "watchdog" on the process of the child welfare system and reasonable efforts is
arguably the most important issue to be "watched." Under the representation model
for which this Article argues, however, the child's attorney cannot be counted on to
raise this or any other "systems issue" consistently. If the child client, for instance,
wishes to be placed out of home, the child's lawyer has no incentive to argue against a
finding that reasonable efforts were made, even if reasonable efforts were not made-
the lawyer has, rather, the opposite incentive.
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rection might define the role of children's counsel out of existence. It
is hoped that devoting greater resources to the theory and practice of
representing children will raise both the quantity and quality of truly
independent advocacy for children. This Conference represents one
step in that direction.
